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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS 
The provision for a Council of Censors in Article 
XLVII of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 represented 
a culmination of fears and apprehension about government 
during the Revolutionary years.  The framers of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution looked to the Council of Censors 
as a defense against change in the governmental structure. 
Citizens in the new nation that had overthrown British 
colonial governments undoubtedly felt hostile toward, or 
at least distrustful of, many aspects of government. 
At first, the existence of such extensive fear and 
distrust seemed peculiar.  At the time, there was no con- 
centration of wealth in the hands of a few, nor did there 
seem to be the possibility of anyone accumulating enough 
wealth to corrupt the entire system.  People generally 
considered one another equal in their rights to liberty, 
property, safety, and religion, although they did recog- 
nize the inequality of men in their "original talents" and 
capabilities. 
The general attitude of Americans at this time favored 
republican equality.  In addition to a political revolu- 
tion, a basic social revolution had also occurred which 
2 
challenged authority and superiority.   Many undoubtedly 
drifted away from the idealistic and time-honored respect 
for order, simplicity, and selflessness in favor of indi- 
vidualism and some disorder. 
The attitudes of Pennsylvanians, as well as other 
Americans, toward governmental authority developed sub- 
stantially from their experiences under English rule. 
Even though they had cast off English rule prior to 
drafting their first constitution in 1776, the corruption 
and foul play of George III remained vivid in their minds. 
The majority of political activists, and even those who 
took a lesser interest in government, developed their 
attitudes from their knowledge of England's past.  Their 
comprehension of constitutionalism and politics stemmed 
mainly from English opposition groups which had equated 
government with power, and which saw in the executive 
Gordon S. Wood, Representation in the American 
Revolution (Charlottesville, Va., 1969), p. 64. 
2Gordon S. Wood, The Rising Glory of America, 1760- 
1820 (New York, 1971), pp. 8-9. 
branch the possibility of conspiracies against constitu- 
tional liberties.   Colonials shared those fears because, 
while the executive's power in England had legally de- 
creased, the executive's legal powers in the colonies had 
increased. 
Power in England eluded legalities, however, since 
corruption provided a means to maintain power.  Such cor- 
ruption angered citizens of both England and America: 
"Corruption, especially in the form of manipulation 
and bribery of the Commons by the gift of places, pensions, 
and sinecures, was as universal a cry in the colonies as 
4 it was in England." 
John Dickinson felt strongly that corruption in the 
English executive branch scared all Americans.  Americans 
did indeed feel the pains of English corruption and abuse 
in government, as indicated in some of John Dickinson's 
comments regarding trade regulation: 
The power of regulation appears to us 
to have been pure in its principle, 
simple in its operation, and salutary 
in its effects.  But for some time 
past we have observed, with pain, that 
it hath been turned to other purposes, 
than it was originally designed for, 
"3 ■"Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics 
(New York, 1968), pp. 66, 105, 136. 
Ibid., p. 56. 
and retaining its title, hath become 
an engine of intolerable oppressions 
and grievous taxations.-* 
Americans concluded that George III was absolute. 
Although on the surface he had maintained the ancient 
forms, he had destroyed the spirit of the English consti- 
tution and of the separation of powers.   By utilizing his 
power of granting places, pensions and honors the King had 
obtained parliamentary sanction for his policies. 
While some English circles might have accepted cor- 
ruption in government, it disgusted American political 
leaders.  They knew of George's manipulations of the elec- 
toral process to achieve his own ends.  It seemed as 
though the constitution were being literally destroyed by 
the very means devised "to secure and protect the people 
[which] had become the engines of destruction."  Nothing 
angered radicals and independent-minded men more than the 
attempt by a frustrated ministry to carry 
out the Crown's supposed responsibilities 
for governing the realm with the necessary 
but often little understood cooperation of 
a balky Parliament—a cooperation that was 
possible only through ministerial management 
and influencing of the House of Commons. 
5 
Political Writings of John Dickinson, 1:415. 
"Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American 
Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969), p. 34 
7Ibid., p. 33. 
It appeared to those who clung to the original prin- 
ciples of the constitution and to the tradition of separa- 
tion of powers, that the crown was "bribing its way into 
tyranny."   However, the king could not be blamed for all 
of the American distrust of power and disillusionment with 
government.  One must not underestimate the extreme dif- 
ferences in attitude and personality between Americans and 
Englishmen.   Englishmen viewed themselves as the gover- 
nors and those wielding the power in the pre-1776 period, 
while Americans saw themselves as the governed, suffering 
the misuse of power by the English government.  After 1776, 
prior English attitudes and activities provided the basis 
for American philosophies on law enforcement.  Such philos- 
ophies took shape primarily in large urban areas such as 
Philadelphia, but spread through the states. 
Unfortunately, Americans were not immune from corrup- 
tion, and they soon found themselves in the midst of 
8Ibid. 
Q 
Allan Nevins, The American States During and After 
the Revolution, 1775-1789 (New York, 1924), p. 24.  A more 
detailed description and account of the differences in 
attitude and personalities that existed between Americans 
and Englishmen may be found in Chapter 1 of the Nevins 
volume. 
10Ibid., p. 260. 
governmental and constitutional problems.    They feared 
the possibility of corruption in their own government, re- 
sulting in an inadequate and weak legislature and a power- 
ful executive, and the transformation of the separation of 
powers into mere empty forms. 
Americans had looked toward increasing autonomy in 
their own governments since the mid-eighteenth century, 
largely as a consequence of the mistakes which they had 
seen.  A more equitable and beneficial government emerged 
as their high goal in 1776.  The Pennsylvania State Consti- 
tution, as well as other state constitutions drafted in 
1776, reflected their awareness of the need to avoid past 
mistakes.  Those constitutions often complicated the proc- 
ess of constitutional change so as to separate powers and 
to reduce the possibility of corruption.  The Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 developed one of the most strict 
amendment provisions in its forty-seventh article, which 
provided for a Council of Censors to meet septennially. 
Only the Council could examine the constitution to deter- 
mine whether defects had appeared or officials had not 
governed properly, and it alone had the power to suggest 
Wood, Creation, p. 417 
12 
amendments. 
The provision for a Council of Censors did not re- 
ceive unquestioned approval as a panacea to rectify all 
possible constitutional ills, but some of the framers of 
the constitution undoubtedly felt that this limited method 
of amendment might prevent quick corruption of the docu- 
ment. 
Surprisingly little American comment appeared about 
the Council of Censors at that time.  Many Pennsylvanians 
viewed it as "eccentric, impractical, and inadequate" for 
keeping Pennsylvania government on a balanced path, but 
others noted the experimental nature of the entire consti- 
13 tution, including Article XLVII. 
In later years, comments did appear in the Federalist 
regarding the Council of Censors, denouncing its apparent 
use of passion, rather than reason, and also questioning 
the 
mere demarkation on parchment of the 
Constitutional limits of the several 
departments.  [It] is not a sufficient 
guard against those encroachments 
which lead to a tyrannical concentration 
12Max Savelle, Seeds of Liberty (Seattle, Wash., 1965), 
pp. 350-351.  Article XLVII of the Pennsylvania Consti- 
tution of 1776 (see Appendix I). 
13 Nevms, American States, p. 153.  Davxd Hawke, In 
the Midst of a Revolution (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 195- 
197. 
of all the powers of government in 
the same hands. 
Although a number of newspapers carried articles re- 
lated to the proceedings of the Council of Censors, they 
carried very little editorial comment, and no substantial 
British comment appeared on the Council of Censors.  The 
bulk of any foreign comment came from the French, who 
apparently took a deeper interest in new American insti- 
tutions than did the British or even some Americans. 
French commentators divided on the worth of the Pennsyl- 
vania Council of Censors.  One school of thought viewed it 
in its most idealistic form, as demonstrated by Brissot de 
Warville:  "An excellent institution, quite proper to up- 
root abuses [corruption, election manipulation, etc., as 
the Americans had seen with George III] which might slip 
1 c into the Constitution and thus prevent its ruin!"1J 
4Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist, No. 50 (Middle- 
town, Conn.:  Wesleyan University Press, 1961), pp. 345- 
346, 336-338. 
15 Jacques (Jean) Pierre Brissot de Warville, "Re- 
flexions sur le code de Pensylvanie," Bibliotheque 
Philosophique Du Legislateur, Du Politic, Du Jurisconsulte, 
III (1782-1785), ed. and trans, by J. Paul Selsam, "Brissot 
de Warville on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776," The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXII 
(Jan. 1948), 25-43. 
J. Paul Selsam and Joseph G. Rayback, eds., "French 
Comment on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776," The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXVI 
(July 1952), 314-315. 
8 
The second French school of thought viewed the 
Council of Censors as a possible center of corruption, as 
exemplified by the Abbe de Mably:  "I fear that a council 
which assembles only every seven years to repair the wrongs 
done to the Constitution. . .would be of all councils the 
most useless; it will be carried away itself by the torrent 
of public morals."    This writer, and others who saw the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 as an assembly of "mag- 
nificent promises," apparently recognized clearly the 
implications of the restrictive nature of the Constitution. 
Unfortunately, Abbe de Mably and his cohorts proved correct 
in their assessment of the Censors and the role of the re- 
strictive constitution in limiting that agency. 
The provision for the Council of Censors probably 
evolved from widespread fears in 1776 that the amending 
process, if too easy, would result in rapid and unnecessary 
changes.  Therefore, only the Council of Censors could pro- 
pose constitutional amendments.  The majority of Pennsyl- 
vania citizens, especially the frontier segments, dis- 
trusted the power previously held by the eastern 
aristocracy, many of whom had been under English influence. 
-'-"ibid. , pp. 317-319, as quoted from Abbe de Mably, 
Observations sur le Gouvernement et les Loix des Etats-Unis 
(Paris, 1784), pp. 93-94. 
However, the constitution's framers went even further than 
the frontiersmen by viewing themselves as the "true repre- 
sentatives of the people—the sovereign power in the 
1 7 
state."    Of course, Pennsylvanians—as well as other 
Americans—had justification for their widespread fears 
regarding political power.  The King's attacks on the 
failing English constitution had developed in them a dis- 
trust of power. 
The framers consequently devised an anti-activist con- 
stitution, which the influential classes could not easily 
change if they later gained control.  Article XLVII of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was vital to the anti- 
ng 
activist tone of that document. 
Although Article XLVII seemed to strengthen the 
Constitution, a closer perusal indicated otherwise.  It 
listed three major duties for the Censors during their 
tenure of "one year, from the date of their election, and 
no longer," and these indicated their importance to the 
preservation of the freedom of the commonwealth.  First, 
17 J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776 (Philadelphia, 1936), pp. 24, 146-152, 258-259.  Lewis 
H. Meader, "The Council of Censors," The Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, XXII (1898), 266. 
■LOWayland F. Dunaway, A History of Pennsylvania 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1948), pp. 178-182.  Nevins, 
American States, pp. 151-154.  A further examination of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 will be found in 
chapter two. 
10 
they had to "enquire whether the constitution has been 
preserved inviolate in every part."19  Considering the 
length of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, such an 
inquiry represented a vast amount of work, especially 
since there could be no preliminary preparation, because 
new Censors were elected for each septennial session.  In 
addition, the constitution failed to enumerate which viola- 
tions needed primary investigation.  If the Censors inves- 
tigated every minor and major infraction of the constitu- 
tion, one year was surely inadequate.  In retrospect, the 
impossible tasks placed on the Council of Censors demon- 
strated the restrictive, anti-activist tone of the 
constitution. 
The second major function of the Council of Censors 
was to inquire "whether the legislative and executive 
branches of government have performed their duty, as 
guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves or 
exercised other or greater powers than they are entitled 
20 to by the constitution."    Again, to assess the perform- 
ance of the legislative and executive branches only every 
seven years would be nearly impossible, especially when 
1 Q 
^Article XLVII (see Appendix I) . 
20Ibid. 
11 
the Censors had other responsibilities. 
The last principal duty of the Council of Censors was 
to "enquire whether the public taxes have been justly laid 
and collected in all parts of this commonwealth, in what 
manner the public monies have been disposed of, and whether 
the laws have been duly executed."    As before, the lack 
of any preliminary or yearly investigation by the Censors 
themselves multiplied the difficulty of the task.  In all 
of their functions, they had to start from the beginning, 
with no investigative resources at their disposal.  How- 
ever, the Censors probably undertook their duties with 
enthusiasm, initially at least, viewing them as essential 
to the preservation of freedom. 
The magnitude of the Censors' task increased even 
more due to the structural arrangements laid out in Article 
XLVII.  In October 1783, and in October of every seventh 
year thereafter, elections were to be held for Censors. 
Two men would be elected from each of the twelve counties, 
22 
as well as two men from the City of Philadelphia.    They 
21Ibid. 
22 In 1783, the twelve counties in Pennsylvania were 
Bucks, Chester, Berks, Lancaster, York, Cumberland, 
Northampton, Bedford, Northumberland, Westmoreland, 
Washington, and Philadelphia (County). 
12 
used the committee system to try to accomplish their tasks. 
The constitution had not provided for payment or employ- 
ment of clerks or assistants.  However, Censors could re- 
2 3 quest state funds to defray their "expenses" as a body. 
Censors also received compensation for their own labors. 
On November 5, 1783, the General Assembly requested of the 
Supreme Executive Council that "the pay for each of the 
Censors. . .be the same as is allowed to a member of the 
Supreme Executive Council."  This amounted to £l7, 6s per 
24 day, plus travel expenses. 
In carrying out their tasks, the Censors had the 
powers to "send for persons, papers, and records," and the 
"authority to pass public censures, to order impeachments, 
and to recommend to the legislature the repealing of such 
laws as appear to them to have been enacted contrary to 
the principles of the constitution."2^  They might have 
held some potential power.  On paper, at least, they repre- 
sented a legal check on the executive and legislative 
-^Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council, XIII, 770, 
It is not clear just what "expenses" the Censors did incur. 
Nothing is evident from their own journal, and even the 
Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council, which had to 
arrange and approve the withdrawal, give no indication of 
the purpose for which the money was needed.  The sum 
generally requested by the Censors was  £ 100. 
24The Pennsylvania Gazette, Nov. 5, 1783; March 31, 
1784. 
25Article XLVII (see Appendix I). 
13 
branches, but while no one in Pennsylvania had any 
authority to veto or dissent against their actions, they 
themselves had no authority to enforce any of their de- 
cisions. 
Yet, it is necessary to go beyond mere legal power. 
The source of their potential power lay in their possible 
use of public relations.  The role of the press cannot be 
underestimated in late eighteenth-century politics.  The 
press represents a vital link in the knowledge of what the 
"average colonist" thought and understood regarding 
American theories of liberty.  A high degree of literacy 
existed, and newspapers circulated widely, indicating an 
obvious influence on the development of political think- 
2 6 ing.    Decades before the revolution, newspapers had 
emphasized the relationship of loyalty and a good consti- 
tution: 
The true object of loyalty is a good 
legal constitution, which as it 
condemns every instance of oppression 
and lawless power, derives a certain 
remedy to the sufferer by allowing 
him to remonstrate his grievances and 
pointing out methods of relief when 
the gentler arts of persuasion have 
lost their efficacy. 
i0Lawrence H. Leder, Liberty and Authority (Chicago, 
1968), pp. 20-24. 
27 (Boston) Independent Advertiser, August 8, 1748 
(#32), as quoted in Leder, Liberty and Authority, p. 31. 
14 
During the decade of the Revolution, America had be- 
come a "nation of newspaper readers."2"  The growth of the 
press and its influence undoubtedly stimulated political 
democratization.  The Revolution itself increased the 
importance and influence of the press by freeing it from 
29 governmental scrutiny.    Further indication of the impor- 
tance of the press appears in one of the Federalist essays, 
In it, the author points out the parallel between freedom 
30 
of the press and free-spirited public opinion.    Although 
many of the ideas expounded dated from two decades prior 
to the revolution, the press probably provided the Censors 
with a potential power greater than any legal authority. 
The Censors had one further "power."  They could: 
call a convention, to meet within 
two years after their sitting, if 
there appear to them an absolute 
necessity of amending any article 
of the constitution, which may be 
defective, explaining such as are 
necessary for the preservation of 
the rights and happiness of the 
people; but the articles to be 
amended, and the amendments proposed, 
28wood, Glory, p. 253.  A perusal of Extracts From the 
Diary of Christopher Marshall (ed. William Duane) indicates 
the importance of the press in the Revolutionary and post- 
Revolutionary era.  In it, one finds countless references 
to "accounts published. ..." 
2
^Bailyn, Origins, p. 146.  Nevins, American States, 
p. 469. 
30cooke, The Federalist, No. 84, p. 580. 
15 
and such articles as are proposed 
to be added or abolished, shall be 
promulgated at least six months 
before the day appointed for the 
election of such convention, for 
the previous consideration of the 
people.31 
This section of Article XLVII again demonstrated the anti- 
activist nature of the constitution.  The framers of the 
constitution must have understood the limited powers of the 
Council of Censors.  Even if they called a convention, they 
could not present their views, since their term expired one 
to two years before the convention met.  Their only hope of 
defending their views lay in their running for election to 
the convention. 
In retrospect, the Council of Censors faced an impos- 
sible political task.  However, not all eighteenth-century 
writers understood the full impact of the restrictive na- 
ture of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.  This was 
exemplified by the French comments noted earlier, and by 
Michel-Rene Hilliard D'Auberteuil, another Frenchman, who 
said of the Council of Censors: 
Does it not have altogether too 
much power, and does not the re- 
ciprocal balance of the executive 
body and the legislative body, 
the respective censure of the 
members of those two bodies, the 
31Article XLVII (see Appendix I) 
16 
publicity of its acts, and the 
liberty of the press suffice?  The 
laws for encouragement of virtue 
for protecting the morals are 
laudible, but they might degenerate 
into a strong inquisition.32 
Yet, not only some of the French proved politically naive 
on the possible lack of ultimate achievements of the 
Council of Censors, but also Thomas Paine himself once 
suggested that a similar body, presumably with similar 
"authority," might prove beneficial if applied on the 
national level. 3 
32Selsam and Rayback, "French Comment," p. 314, as 
quoted from M. D'Auberteuil, Essais Historiques et 
Politiques sur les Anglo-Americains (Brussels, 1781), p. 189 
3-^Robert L. Brunhouse, The Counter-Revolution in 
Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pa., 1942), p. 61. 
17 
CHAPTER II 
RESTRICTIVE NATURE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
CONSTITUTION OF 1776 
The impossible task faced by the Council of Censors 
grew in large part from the restrictive, anti-activist 
nature of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.  That 
document reflected the negative attitude of its framers 
toward the pre-revolutionary government which they be- 
lieved had provided little, if any, representation of a 
beneficial nature.  The desire for a republican-type of 
government of their own brought about the necessity of re- 
bellion in 1775.   A brief discussion of the restrictive 
nature of the 1776 constitution will be beneficial. 
Overcompensation in drafting the constitution re- 
sulted from this negative attitude, producing a document 
that exhibited anti-activist and restrictive tones.  In 
retrospect, one might wonder whether such a constitution 
Hfood, Creation, pp. 107-108 
18 
represented more freedom and liberty than the King's 
government had afforded prior to 1776.  The framers of the 
new government undoubtedly viewed matters differently.  To 
them, their efforts probably culminated in devising an 
instrument which would protect the interests of Pennsyl- 
vanians from arbitrary abuses which they had suffered 
under the King.  Unfortunately, this political thinking 
showed some lack of ultimate direction based on an under- 
standing of fundamental principles which would meet their 
desires of and future needs for growth of freedom.  Rather, 
the framers seemed more preoccupied only with immediate 
2 
concerns. 
Confident that they had fulfilled their duties with 
sufficient responsibility, the framers failed to obtain 
formal approval of the constitution by the people or rep- 
resentatives other than those constructing the document. 
By no means were these men naive enough to believe that 
3 
the people would receive it with joy or with unanimity. 
They must have feared some discontent; nevertheless, they 
acted as they viewed themselves—guardians of the people. 
^William S. Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania 
Politics (Stanford, Calif., 1964), p. IX. 
JDavid Hawke, In the Midst of a Revolution (Phila- 
delphia, 1961), p. 189. 
19 
More than just a result of this guardianship attitude, 
however, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 developed 
as a tool which would insure the dominance of the leaders 
who had devised it, or at least of those in sympathy with 
their political theories.  After all, that same group of 
"Radicals" had recently emerged victorious in their 
struggle with old Whig elements in the state, who might 
have been content to continue to exist with the previous 
government.   The constitution thus derived was actually 
obstructionist or restrictive in nature.  The motivation 
for the inclusion of such restrictions stemmed from what 
Allan Nevins had labelled "the very keynote of the 
American Revolution."  Constitutional framers undoubtedly 
felt they had fulfilled the "supreme function of the 
state" by protecting life, liberty, and property, the 
natural rights of all men.   Nonetheless, their zeal in 
protecting such rights destroyed any effort to create a 
flexible document. 
Typical of the restrictive ideas were:  the test oath 
4David L. Jacobsen, John Dickinson and the Revolution 
in Pennsylvania:  1764-1776 (Berkeley, Calif., 1965), pp. 
120-121.  The term "Radicals" here refers to a political 
following also known as "Constitutionalists," as opposed 
to the "Republicans" ("Whigs").  These two political 
alignments will be further discussed in succeeding chapters 
5Nevins, American States, 2nd ed., p. 119. 
20 
for all voters, in essence assuring that such voters did 
not oppose dominant ideas; the relatively subordinate, un- 
wieldy, and limited plural executive, resulting in a lack 
of enforcing authority; the single, centralized Assembly; 
and the weak, if not powerless, Council of Censors.  Aside 
from the lack of power enjoyed by the executive branch, it 
remained further restricted by the three-year limit on 
tenure in office.  Re-election of the same person could 
occur only after a four-year lapse.   No such regulations 
hampered the legislators in the Assembly. 
The provisions for rotation of elective office and 
for the Test Oath were most demonstrative of the anti- 
activist nature of the constitution.  The main objective 
of the Radicals in mandating rotation of offices, coupled 
with the ban on multiple office-holding, emerged as the 
prevention of the formation of a new and "inconvenient 
aristocracy."  The Test Oath provided that voters should 
swear their allegiance to the new government, thereby af- 
firming that they remained content with the government and 
would not seek changes in the system.  The oath read: 
Hawke, Revolution, pp. 188-189.  Burton A. Konkle, 
George Bryan and the Constitution of Pennsylvania;  1731- 
1791, (Philadelphia, 1922), pp. 258-260.  A further dis- 
cussion of the test oath may be found in the Hawke volume 
noted above. 
21 
do swear (or 
affirm) that I will be faithful and 
true to the commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, and that I will not 
directly or indirectly do any act or 
thing prejudicial or injurious to the 
constitution or government thereof, 
as established by the convention. 
Opposition to this test oath, more than any other factor 
alone, brought about the severe conflicts between Radicals 
and Whigs that later hampered the Council of Censors. 
Whig supporters clearly saw that provision only as a means 
to prevent their constructive participation within the new 
frame of government. 
The culmination of this obstructionist, anti-activist 
frame of government occurred with the writing of Article 
Forty-Seven, establishing a Council of Censors.  Provisions 
allowing only the Censors to propose constitutional amend- 
ments was intended to preserve the constitution as orig- 
inally drafted by its framers.  The election of Censors 
once every seven years, with the authority to enquire, in- 
vestigate, and possibly to call for constitutional conven- 
tions within two years after their one-year term, was to 
assure the Radicals of no changes for a minimum of eight 
years.  Most likely, as perhaps realized by some of the 
7 
Jacobsen, Dickinson, pp. 120-121.  Test Oath as 
quoted in Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, p. 164. 
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framers, changes would not occur even then, due to a 
severe lack of continuity, since the Censors who proposed 
articles for amendment might not be chosen as representa- 
Q 
tives to the ensuing constitutional convention.   Although 
constitutional amendment was extraordinarily difficult, it 
was not impossible.  Article Forty-Seven provided that 
proposed amendments be published six months prior to 
election of constitutional convention delegates in order 
that citizens could convey their wishes to those delegates. 
However, the system proved awkward at best, probably by 
original design. 
This awkwardness did not evolve as part of some 
sinister plot to prevent necessary changes.  It more likely 
developed from widespread fears that the amending process, 
if too easy, might unfortunately result in changes of 
little real consequence or need.  Facing the reality that 
constitutional changes might someday be necessary, the 
authors of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided 
a means to investigate and initiate change through the 
Council of Censors.  In theory, at least, the convening 
of a Council of Censors every seven years could have occur- 
red expressly for the purpose of reviewing and revising the 
o 
"Article XLVII (see Appendix I).  Selsam, Pennsylvania 
Constitution, p. 200.  Hawke, Revolution, p. 188. 
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constitution.  Such a council might have the benefit of 
9 
experience and could prevent the accumulation of errors. 
A strong distinction between the fundamental law of 
the constitution and mere statutory law existed through- 
out America within the same cautious framework as fears of 
easy amending processes.  Therefore, several of the states 
developed their own devices to put their constitutions be- 
yond the reach of mere legislative acts. °  For Pennsyl- 
vania, that device embodied itself in the Council of 
Censors.  Apparently, the desire to protect the natural 
rights of men, and the resulting obstructionist point of 
view had spread through the states, due to the sad govern- 
mental experiences in the pre-revolutionary years. 
Although in some areas of New England, New York City, 
and isolated regions of the South many expressed the 
opinion that only the people-at-large could amend consti- 
tutions, the majority of the provisions for legislative 
changes indicated a different point of view.  Pennsylvania 
had perhaps the most complicated procedure for constitu- 
tional change, but other states developed procedures nearly 
q 
Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, p. 24.  Nelson F, 
Adkins, ed., Thomas Paine:  "Common Sense" and Other Po- 
litical Writings (New York, 1953), pp. 136-137. 
"•-^Wood, Creation, p. 308.  Konkle, George Bryan, 
p. 129. 
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as restrictive.  The Delaware Constitution, for example, 
specified certain articles as being immune from change, 
and required the consent of five-sevenths of the Assembly 
and of the Legislative Council for other alterations.  The 
Maryland Constitution required the acts of two successive, 
separately elected legislatures to accomplish constitution- 
al amendment.    Although change was inevitable, it was 
obviously something the founding fathers wished to avoid. 
It undoubtedly represented a possible retrogression to a 
time or condition of government when changes occurred to 
suit individual whims.  In addition, the authority of the 
constitutional conventions ultimately required for changes 
to the Pennsylvania constitution caused a feeling of in- 
security on the part of the people.  Wood has stated that 
in the context of eighteenth- 
century thought the idea of a 
legal body [constitutional con- 
vention] existing outside of 
the representative legislature 
and making law which the legis- 
lature could not make was such 
a radical innovation in 
politics. 
One may safely suppose that ordinary people did not 
i;LWood, Creation, pp. 308-309.  Further details and 
examples of restrictive, obstructionist provisions for 
amendment to other state constitutions are outlined through- 
out these pages. 
12Wood, Creation, p. 309. 
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understand many of the strange, obstructionist innovations, 
such as the provision for the Council of Censors in state 
constitutions.  Furthermore, those same ordinary people 
probably did not desire such complications.  Yet, their 
main concern still lay in the elimination of kingly, par- 
liamentary, and proprietary powers under which they had 
] 3 
"suffered."    While much of this suffering resulted from 
military conflict, it had, nevertheless, represented what 
they remembered as "government." 
Quite possibly, these people distrusted even the edu- 
cated men who drew up the first state constitution.  Iron- 
ically, at least one of the educated men involved in 
drafting the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 did dis- 
trust educated men himself.  James Cannon, a mathematics 
professor at the College of Philadelphia, saw "all learn- 
ing as an artificial restraint on the human understanding." 
He viewed professionals and educated men as having no part 
in a democratic government.  Oddly enough, Cannon, the 
"fanatical schoolmaster," has received the bulk of the 
credit for the development of the idea to create a Council 
of Censors, and for Article XLVII of the Pennsylvania 
13 Konkle, George Bryan, p. 131 
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14 Constitution of 1776 in general. 
Even though the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 
limited political activity and made change difficult, to 
be initiated only by a Council of Censors, comments from 
the French essayist Demeunier indicate an underlying dis- 
trust on the part of Pennsylvanians at the time: 
Pennsylvania has reserved the power 
to establish at certain periods the 
censors who desire to maintain the 
constitution and to execute the laws. 
The most enlightened citizens of 
America make light of this institu- 
tion which the ancient republics 
regarded so highly.  They are per- 
suaded that the censors will disturb 
the state and the administration; and 
that if they were useful for the 
peoples of antiquity, the circum- 
stances are no longer the same, and 
that the liberty of the press is the 
only censure which it is proper to 
establish today in republics.-'-^ 
Initially, and idealistically perhaps, the framers of 
the constitution may have set out to prepare a document 
that would remove the abuses they had seen under former 
Crown rule.  At the outset, the restrictive, anti-activist 
-*-^Ibid. , p. 121.  In addition to Cannon and his lead- 
ership of the movement to develop the Council of Censors, 
Justice George Bryan has also been linked to Article XLVII 
For more information on these theories, see Frederic A. 
Godcharles, Daily Stories of Pennsylvania (Milton, Pa., 
1924), p. 794, and Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, 
p. 201. 
15Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, pp. 316-317, as 
quoted from Demeunier, Essai Sur Les Etats-Unis (Paris, 
1786), p. 18. 
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nature of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 developed 
as a means of preventing the ruin of the constitution and 
new government by such abuses.  This obstructive nature 
formed the boundary line between the Radicals (Constitu- 
tionalists) and the Whigs (Anti-Constitutionalists).  By 
the time of the first Council of Censors in 178 3, the 
original purposes of such restrictions, if positive in the 
first place, had been subordinated to the issues of pre- 
serving that constitution without change.  To that end, 
supporters of the Constitution of 1776 could use that docu- 
ment to their advantage, since the Censors thereby had no 
direct ability to change the Constitution and the Radicals 
had no desire. ° 
1 6 xoAn interesting essay on this lack of desire appears 
in The Federalist, No. 50, pp. 344-346, ed. Jacob E. Cooke, 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CENSORS' WINTER SESSION 
Constitutional restrictions represented only one of 
the major deterrents to positive action on the part of the 
Council of Censors.  In addition to that problem, parti- 
san politics plagued the Censors during their sessions 
both in the winter of 1783 and in the summer of 1784. 
Partisan politics in Pennsylvania originated with the 
Constitution of 1776.  Most states either did not have 
such politically active inhabitants, or did not grant suf- 
ficient power to the people to permit them to challenge 
constitutional guidelines.  However, as Jackson Turner 
Main indicated, in Pennsylvania "the constitution was so 
democratic that it antagonized powerful elements in 
society."  The constitution itself then was responsible 
for the alignment of two major political parties by the 
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time the first Council of Censors met in 1783.   These two 
divisions called themselves "Republicans" (or "Anti- 
Constitutionalists") and "Constitutionalists" ("Radicals"). 
The two sessions exhibited numerous instances in which the 
main criterion for voting seemed simply to be partisan 
alignment. 
As specified in Article Forty-Seven of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, the necessary election 
for Censors took place throughout the state on the "second 
Tuesday in October," seven years after that document had 
become the law of the state.  At the time of that election 
(October 14, 1783), Pennsylvania consisted of twelve 
counties.  As outlined in Article Forty-Seven, two elected 
Censors represented each of these counties, as well as two 
from the City of Philadelphia. 
Jackson Turner Main, Political Parties Before the 
Constitution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973), p. 174. Hawke, 
Partisanship, pp. 194-195. 
The term "party" used here and throughout this thesis 
does not imply the modern definition of an organized 
political grouping.  "Parties" in this era did not ex- 
hibit the organization of today's political parties. 
Rather, the term represents a designation for a vast 
number of men adhering to a common idea. 
Article XLVII.  (See Appendix L) 
The twelve counties at that time included:  Bedford, 
Berks, Bucks, Chester, Cumberland, Lancaster, Northampton, 
Northumberland, Philadelphia, Washington, Westmoreland, 
and York. 
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The final tally for the initial session of the 
Council of Censors showed thirteen Republicans (Anti- 
Constitutionalists) pitted against thirteen Radicals (Con- 
stitutionalists) .  The Republicans, however, did manage to 
gain dominance through the election of Frederick 
Muhlenberg as the first President of the body, as well as 
the election of Arthur St. Clair as President pro tempore, 
although both of these positions were temporary and 
3 
changed through the Censors1 term. 
Preparations for the Censors' meetings were mad4,..-. 
following the elections.  On November 5, 1783, the General 
Assembly in Philadelphia requested the Supreme Executive 
Council to "provide a convenient apartment in this city 
JThe sessxon opened with the following representative 
censors present:  from the City of Philadelphia, Samuel 
Miles and Thomas FitzSimons, both Republicans; from 
Philadelphia County, Frederick Muhlenberg (elected presi- 
dent of the body) and Arthur St. Clair, both Republicans; 
from Bucks County, Joseph Hart and Samuel Smith, both 
Constitutionalists; from Chester County, Anthony Wayne and 
James Moore, both Republicans; from Lancaster County, 
Stephen Chambers, a Republican, and John Whitehill, a 
Constitutionalist; from York County, Thomas Hartley and 
Richard McAllister, both Republicans; from Cumberland 
County, William Irvine, a Republican, and James McLene, 
a Constitutionalist; from Berks County, James Read and 
Baltzer Gehr, both Constitutionalists; from Northampton 
County, John Arndt, a Republican, and Simon Driesbach, a 
Constitutionalist; from Bedford County, David Espy and 
Samuel Davidson, both Republicans; from Northumberland 
County, William Montgomery and Samuel Hunter, both Consti- 
tutionalists; from Westmoreland County, John Smiley and 
William Findley, both Constitutionalists; and from 
Washington County, James Edgar and John McDowell, both 
Constitutionalists.  Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, p. 278. 
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[Philadelphia] for the Council of Censors to meet in; and 
that the pay for each of the Censors to be the same as is 
allowed to a member of the Supreme Executive Council" 
[£l7,   6s per day].  Censors could also request withdrawal 
4 
of funds to defray expenses they might incur. 
In order to carry out the four principal duties out- 
lined in Article Forty-Seven of the constitution (see 
Appendix I), the Censors had the power to "send for 
persons, papers, and records," and could pass public 
censures, order impeachments, and recommend to the legis- 
lature the repeal of any laws, thought by them to have 
been enacted contrary to the principles of the constitu- 
5 
tion.   Although on the surface, this seemed to grant them 
a great deal of power, one must remember the restrictions 
of the constitution in general, as reviewed earlier. 
The first session of the Council of Censors opened on 
November 13, 1783.  The recent signing of the peace treaty 
in France (September 3, 1783) ending the American Revolu- 
tion intensified partisanship in Pennsylvania.  Several of 
the Censors had been active in previous partisan align- 
ments in the state and simply continued their activity 
1784. 
5 
The Pennsylvania Gazette, Nov. 5, 1783, March 31, 
Article XLVII.  (See Appendix I.) 
32 
over the question of retaining the constitution as it had 
been written. 
Although the initial seating of the Censors showed 
thirteen Republicans and thirteen Radicals, James McLene, 
William Montgomery, and Samuel Hunter did not appear after 
the first meeting, thereby leaving an effective membership 
of thirteen Republicans and only ten Constitutionalists. 
There existed a major correspondence between party affilia- 
tions and geographic location.  For instance, in each 
county except Lancaster, Cumberland, and Northampton, both 
Censors represented the same party affiliation.  Further- 
more, the western counties (e.g. Washington and Westmore- 
land) , heavily dominated by Scotch-Irish, leaned toward 
the Constitutionalist way of thinking, possibly due to 
their distrust of governmental power. 
The Council of Censors usually met only in the 
morning, from about ten o'clock until noon, Monday through 
Saturday.  Business did not flow easily for the Censors. 
Several meetings adjourned early because committee reports 
7 
were not ready.   In addition to internal political ills, 
1783, 
6Cooke, The Federalist, No. 50, pp. 343-346. 
7 
Journal of the Council of Censors, November 26, 
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the Censors often suffered during their winter sessions 
because the Assembly simply refused to forward requested 
papers, minutes, and other documents.  When the Assembly 
did not refuse outright, it often simply ignored the 
Censors' requests. 
Although such reluctance commonly occurred, the most 
serious case centered about the so-called "Wyoming Con- 
troversy," involving land at the northern end of the 
Susquehanna River, claimed before the Revolutionary War 
by citizens of both Pennsylvania and Connecticut.  In 1778, 
Congress had sent troops to defend this Wyoming region. 
Later, the "Trenton Decree" granted Pennsylvania juris- 
diction over the area, and so the Connecticut settlers 
petitioned the Pennsylvania Assembly to legitimize their 
holdings.  By that time, the Pennsylvania claimants, 
supported by the Republicans, had two companies of state 
rangers sent to that frontier.  The Republicans then 
worked with the Supreme Executive Council to demand that 
the Connecticut settlers pull out—a demand backed by the 
presence of troops.  Upon hearing of the incident, the 
Council of Censors in November 1783 demanded from the 
Assembly all papers and reports relating to the Wyoming 
Controversy.  The Assembly kept the Censors waiting until 
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o 
August 1784 for their answer:  an uncompromising "No!" 
The Wyoming incident represented an early crisis in 
the Council of Censors.  It also clearly exposed the two 
major problems that affected the body:  lack of authority 
and partisan politics.  The lack of authority stemmed from 
the restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania Constitution 
of 1776, as discussed in Chapter II.  In spite of the 
Censors' supposed power, they could not force the Assembly 
to do anything against its will, for they had no enforcing 
authority.  By the time the Assembly responded in 1784, 
the Constitutionalists dominated the Censors, but the 
Republicans still held the majority in the Assembly. 
Party strife had developed in the earliest days of the 
constitution, and there is little doubt that the intense 
political differences certainly helped motivate the lack 
Q 
of cooperation in 1784. 
o 
Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, pp. 128-130. 
9 
Ibid.  Hawke, Revolution, pp. 194-195.  Nevins, 
American States, pp. 155-156, 185.  Jason S. Biddle and 
Craig Biddle, eds., Autobiography of Charles Biddle, Vice- 
President of the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia, 1883), p. 195. 
The Council of Censors finally did acquire some of 
the papers that they wanted, much to the dismay of the 
Assembly.  One William Bradford, Jr., of Wyoming, for- 
warded some papers, mostly depositions of settlers, re- 
lating to the controversy, to the Censors on September 8, 
1784 (Pennsylvania Archives, Series I, Vol. X, p. 655). 
However, they did not reach Philadelphia in time to be of 
any value. 
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Partisanship did dominate the Council of Censors, as 
evidenced in the investigation of one of the Council's 
most important objectives:  determining whether or not the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required amendment.  Dis- 
cussion of this topic suffered a delay of several weeks. 
General discussion regarding the articles did not begin 
until late December 1783, and only in January 1784 did it 
culminate in a committee to investigate the articles and 
to list those in need of amendment.  The committee con- 
sisted of Arthur St. Clair, Thomas FitzSimons, Samuel 
Miles, Thomas Hartley, and John Arndt. 
Considering the depths of political partisanship, as 
well as the Republican majority in the Council of Censors, 
it is interesting, but not too surprising, to note that 
all five men came from the Republican camp.  Only the 
Council President, Frederick Muhlenberg, a Republican, had 
the authority to appoint committees. 
The changes proposed by the committee would have 
turned the Constitution of 177 6 upside down, rather than 
simply alter it, although in some instances sound reason- 
ing cannot be denied.  The committee first proposed the 
establishment of a bicameral legislature with the lower 
°Harry Marlin Tinkcom, The Republicans and 
Federalists in Pennsylvania:  1790-1801 (Harrisburg, Pa., 
1950), p. 5. 
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house essentially as it was, but with the addition of a 
new upper house, the Legislative Council.  They felt that 
a single legislative house did not provide an adequate 
check on possible tyrannical factions within the legisla- 
ture itself; and because uncontrolled power, a possibility 
with only one house, could allow the house to usurp the 
power of the executive and judiciary.  In the most 
extreme case, revolution would have emerged as the only 
alternative.  A deeper, more fundamental reasoning ex- 
hibits itself, however, when one considers the results of 
some of Allan Nevins' research in this area.  It had been 
seven years since the implementation of the constitution, 
and "a series of wartime shocks taught the States that 
their legislatures were much too strong, their executive 
departments too weak." 
In analyzing Article III, dealing with the executive 
branch, the committee felt that supreme executive power 
should not be vested in a council for several reasons: 
1) it meant constant expense; 2) a large body, though wise, 
could not make quick, emergency decisions with agreement; 
3) no individual could be held accountable for actions; 
4) a prevailing faction in the assembly might elect, as 
11Report from the Journal of the Council of Censors, 
Jan. 19, 1784.  Nevins, American States, 2nd ed., p. 171. 
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president, someone who would submit to their wishes.  The 
committee proposed a "Governor."  They wanted to give the 
government power, and that required some ability to control 
power.  A single executive could provide that ability. 
The committee of five also felt that judges of the 
Supreme Court should have fixed salaries and tenure for 
the duration of their "good behavior," as opposed to the 
then current system of commissioning justices every seven 
years because:  1) lives, property and liberty depended on 
the independence of the judges; 2) judges who refused to 
obey unconstitutional laws passed by the Assembly could 
be removed under the seven-year commission plan; 3) the 
seven-year program made some judges biased toward the 
assembly's wishes, as they looked forward to favorable re- 
consideration at the end of their seven years.  This 
creation of judicial independence.also would have provided 
more of the power for government which the original con- 
stitution had restricted or lacked completely. 
Above and beyond the basic changes in the legislative, 
judicial, and executive branches, the committee proposed 
the abolition of rotation of "sundry offices."  Detrimental 
features of the office rotation included the hope for re- 
appointment, the elimination of men of talent, and the 
deprivation of the people's right to elect their own 
officials. 
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The committee also proposed the addition to the con- 
stitution of a "no ex post facto" clause, but suggested 
eliminating part of Article V (regarding training for the 
militia) which directed that major officers be elected by 
the people.  Also, instead of a one-year residency for 
foreigners to gain citizenship, the committee proposed two 
years. 
The committee suggested as an addition to Article 
XIII, which dealt with the doors of the house being open, 
that the results of open ballots be published weekly. 
Reasons for assent could be published, but not reasons for 
dissent, under the pretense that such activity would "tend 
to foment party disputes."  Jackson Turner Main's research 
implied that such a statement must have evolved only as a 
political ploy.  Partisanship in the state ran too deep 
for many years even after the meetings of the Council of 
Censors to suppose that the announced explanation would be 
x.  1.1    12 •       • acceptable.    Considering the extreme nature of the po- 
litical alignments, in both directions, a more probable 
explanation is that the inability to publish dissenting 
reasons reduced the possibility that good arguments might 
12Report from the Journal of the Council of Censors, 
Jan. 19, 1784.  Greater detail regarding political parti- 
sanship can be gained from Main, Political Parties, 
Chapter 7, especially pp. 184-187. 
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persuade some of the majority to shift alignments.  After 
all, at the time this Republican committee proposed the 
alterations and amendments, their party held the majority 
in the Assembly, as well as in the Council of Censors. 
The proposed Article XVII provided for representation 
in the house based on taxables in a district.  This com- 
mittee set the ratios of one representative in Assembly 
per 1,250 taxables, and one in the Legislative Council [if 
formed] per 2,500 taxables, with the number of representa- 
tives in the Assembly never to exceed one hundred, and 
the number in the Legislative Council not to exceed fifty. 
The Legislative Council proposed by the committee 
would have provided the following initial representation: 
two from the City of Philadelphia, three from Philadelphia 
County, two from Bucks County, and three from Chester 
County, all to serve three years; four from Lancaster 
County, three from York County, three from Cumberland 
County, and two from Berks County, all to serve two years; 
two from Northampton County, one from Bedford County, one 
from Northumberland County, one from Westmoreland County, 
and one from Washington County, all to serve only one-year 
terms.  Although the Republicans maintained that the rep- 
resentation and tenure schedules were arrived at arbi- 
trarily, obvious Radical strongholds (e.g. Washington and 
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Westmoreland Counties) would have their effectiveness re- 
stricted by their members' limited initial tenure in 
office.  However, at the end of various expiration dates, 
all counties would elect new representatives, all to serve 
three years until the next election. 
The final change proposed by the committee to in- 
vestigate possible amendments to the constitution involved 
the elimination of Article XLVII, thereby abolishing the 
1 ? Council of Censors.    Speculation leads to the assumption 
that the Republicans, at least, had recognized the restric- 
tions of the constitution, including the awkward method for 
amendment embodied in the Council of Censors.  By recom- 
mending amendments that would have provided more power in 
government, the Council of Censors could have been elimi- 
nated along with all other anti-activist restrictions. 
The political struggles that helped undermine any 
positive contributions the Council of Censors might have 
attempted to make, had it had the needed authority, sur- 
faced clearly in the balloting results regarding proposed 
amendments.  The committee had proposed fourteen major 
amendments, as well as numerous minor changes to the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.  Ballots were taken 
•"-•^Report from the Journal of the Council of Censors, 
Jan. 19, 1784. 
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after an explanation of each proposed change.  In every 
case, the voting produced the same results.  The votes in 
favor of the changes always came from the same twelve 
Republicans (Anti-Constitutionalists), and the votes 
against amendments always came from the same nine Consti- 
tutionalists.  James Read, a Constitutionalist, and Samuel 
Davidson, a Republican, both abstained on all official 
ballots.14 
Such partisan division probably helped to prompt 
Thomas FitzSimons to move on January 21, 1784, that no de- 
cision be made on the calling of a convention, following 
the reading of the changes.  Previous ballots on the 
question of calling a convention had produced the same 
results as outlined above.  Even though the Censors knew 
they would not have to commit themselves to a convention 
vote, the ballot remained the same, except that James 
Read, a Constitutionalist, voted for the first time, now 
siding with the Republicans, possibly because he did not 
have to justify his position to Constitutionalist cohorts 
in that unofficial ballot.  Unquestionably, in many in- 
stances, emotion played a greater part in the Council of 
Censors than did reason.  Political overtones also exhibi- 
ted themselves in the Censors' procedure of allowing 
14Ibid.  Main, Political Parties, pp. 180-181 
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arguments, both for and against proposals, to be presented 
only after a final ballot had been taken.  The provision 
1 c 
had little reason to it, but neither side objected. J 
i 
The examination of defects in the constitution repre- 
sented the initial step to a constitutional convention for 
the adoption of amendments.  Republicans, having presented 
their case, pressed hard for a convention; however, while 
they mustered a simple majority, they lacked the two- 
thirds majority necessary to call a convention.  Realizing 
this, they took advantage of the majority they held to 
adjourn the Censors until June 1, 1784, hoping that they 
could encourage citizens to persuade the recalcitrant 
Radical Censors to reconsider. " 
During the investigation regarding the articles of the 
constitution, a different politically oriented problem 
arose, one involving the general election that had occurred 
in the City of Philadelphia on October 14, 1783.  The 
intercession of the Censors came about upon their receipt 
of a "Petition of the Subscribers, Freemen, and Electors 
17 
of the City of Philadelphia" contesting the election. 
15Journal of the Council of Censors, Jan. 21, 1784. 
Main, Political Parties, p. 182.  Brunhouse, Counter-Revo- 
lution, p. 158. 
^•"Journal of the Council of Censors, Jan. 24, 1784. 
17Ibid., Dec. 30, 1783. 
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The election problem fell outside the jurisdiction of 
the Council of Censors, but it tended to extend its author- 
ity to practically any item mentioned in the constitution. 
A contested election was a case for the courts, but the 
Censors quickly accepted the responsibility upon receiving 
the petition.  Action by the Censors began on January 3, 
1784, and proceeded rather thoroughly.  The heart of the 
controversy centered around a partisan accusation—the 
Republicans claimed that the Radicals (in the minority at 
that time) had inspired the petition and had contested the 
election in the first place. 
The Radicals maintained that a large number of state 
militia had appeared at the Philadelphia polls on the day 
of the election, with one Captain Jones standing by the 
balloting window.  They further asserted that many of the 
militiamen—supposedly present only to cast their ballots — 
had been brought into Philadelphia in order to swing the 
election to the Republicans, and were not, in fact, be- 
lieved to have been citizens of that city.  Radicals 
claimed that these soldiers had received prepared ballots, 
which Captain Jones inspected before the soldiers deposited 
them.18 
18Ibid., Jan. 3, 1784 
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Both Radicals and Republicans on the Council of 
Censors did agree that of the 1,630 votes cast in the 
Philadelphia election, 2 30 had not come from recorded tax- 
ables.  While Radicals maintained these represented 
soldiers' votes, Republicans suggested that those votes 
could have been cast by sons of freeholders, who had just 
turned twenty-one, a perfectly legal process.  In the in- 
vestigation that followed, sixteen witnesses testified 
before the Censors.  Those witnesses included voters, ward 
inspectors, judges of the election, and James Read, a Con- 
19 
stitutionalist member of the Council of Censors.    Except 
for Read, the political affiliation of the witnesses is 
unknown; therefore, no accurate conclusions regarding po- 
litical motivation in the selection of witnesses can be 
drawn. 
The balloting results on this issue suggest the parti- 
sanship nature of the dispute, in that balloting produced 
the same results that had been obtained when voting on the 
20 proposed amendments to the constitution.    The same twelve 
Republicans who had voted to approve the proposed amend- 
ments voted in favor of upholding the election.  Those who 
19Ibid. 
20 The Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 7, 1784 
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had voted against the amendments voted to void the elec- 
tion.  James Read had abstained, because of his participa- 
tion as a witness; thus the ballot stood at thirteen to 
nine.  The Republicans, therefore, obtained a majority, 
and upheld the election. 
While no hard evidence substantiated the Republican 
charges that Radicals had inspired the petition, the 
balloting does indicate the strong partisan nature and 
stand of the Council of Censors itself.  When the Censors 
had completed their investigation of the Philadelphia 
election early in January 1784, they received two other 
claims of contested elections, one from Northumberland 
County, and one from Chester County.  The disputes centered 
around exactly the same issues, although in Northumberland 
County the two Censors came from the Constitutionalist 
Party, but Republicans had gained the majority in the re- 
mainder of the general election.  Dogmatic partisanship 
strife and strength surfaced again in both cases, as the 
balloting and final results paralleled those of the 
7 1 Philadelphia election dispute.    In the end, since Repub- 
licans still held the majority, both elections stood. 
The arguments, balloting, and final results indicate 
2
-*-Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, p. 14 5 
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the political ties that helped to hamper any progress the 
Censors could have made.  Equally important, however, is 
the fact that had the Constitutionalists gained a majority 
in these ballots, the Council of Censors did not possess 
authority to declare any of the elections void. 
One further problem plagued £he Council of Censors 
throughout the duration of its existence—committee work 
did not necessarily flow smoothly.  While the committee to 
investigate possible amendments to the constitution re- 
ported its findings, its counterpart to investigate whether 
or not the constitution had been "preserved inviolate" did 
not issue any report in the winter session.  That committee 
organized on November 19, 1783, and consisted of Thomas 
FitzSimons, Anthony Wayne, William Irvine [all Republicans], 
22 John Smiley, and James Read [both Constitutionalists]. 
Anthony Wayne and William Irvine had been closely as- 
sociated in the military during the Revolution.  Examples 
of their correspondence as Censors demonstrate both the 
partisan politics that affected the work of the Censors, 
and a possible prevailing attitude that might have caused 
serious committee delays.  On December 9, 1783, Wayne, in- 
carcerated at Easton for disorderly conduct, wrote to 
22The Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 7, 1784.  Also, see 
Appendix I. 
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Irvine: 
Are you good at procrastination? 
Remember that you are now a Censor, 
so that the summary way of doing 
business to which some of us have 
been in the exercise of for near 
eight years will not do so well in 
our present station!  I mean by 
this to show you the necessity of 
not being in too great a hurry to 
report on the City Election.  I 
expect that many false insinua- 
tions will be made. . .and that I 
shall have my share of them.^3 
Irvine's reply clearly indicates the strong partisan ties 
that dominated the work undertaken by the Council of 
Censors: 
The enclosed [summary of activi- 
ties] will show you that there is 
occasion for your presence, but 
there are a variety of matters 
yet more urgent.  I hope you are 
well recovered.  We cannot now 
venture a single question in the 
absence of even one member. . . . 
I hope this is a sufficient hint 
to you. 
William Hartley informed his friend, Jasper Yeates, 
an attorney in Bush Hill, on January 13, 1784, that "to- 
morrow morning we shall bring in our report on the altera- 
tions of the Constitution which we hope will be 
23Historical Society of Philadelphia, Wayne MSS (Dec, 
13, 1783), vol. 19, p. 33.  ("Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania" hereinafter referred to as "HSP".) 
24 Ibid., (Dec. 18, 1783), p. 37 
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pleasing. ..."  Those anticipated results did not come 
about.  The Republicans then took advantage of their 
majority, which was sufficient to adjourn the Censors, and 
did so a few weeks later on January 24.  The committee to 
investigate whether the constitution had been preserved 
inviolate helped to precipitate this action by its report 
that it had not had sufficient time; hence, no report was 
2S for thcommg. 
At the end of this first session, then, the Council 
of Censors could point to no real results.  It had made 
investigations, both within and outside its jurisdiction, 
but ..it had only fulfilled part of its responsibility as 
outlined in Article Forty-Seven. If the individual Censors 
had not realized it previously, their eyes must have been 
opened to the fact that the Council of Censors had no en- 
forcing authority whatsoever, as exemplified by its dif- 
ficulties with the Assembly.  Furthermore, their actions 
on the elections or similar issues meant almost nothing, 
since no one in the state was required to abide by their 
decisions, whether positive or negative and they did not 
possess authority to pass such judgment officially.  The 
restrictive constitution had posed such limitations upon 
25HSP, Yeates Papers (Jan. 13, 1784), Folder 3.  The 
Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 7, 1784. 
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them.  Finally, the lack of accomplishment and, in some 
cases, of action at all in the winter session stemmed from 
the strong partisan politics that existed within the state, 
and especially within the Council of Censors in 1783-1784. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMER 1784—POLITICAL REVERSAL 
During the four months between adjourning on 
January 24, 1784, and reconvening on June 1, 1784, the 
Republican Censors had hoped to influence private citizens 
to persuade the Constitutionalist members to vote for a 
constitutional convention.  Perhaps in response to this, 
several private citizens submitted lengthy articles to 
The Pennsylvania Gazette, calling for their fellow citizens 
to seriously consider the question of the proposed amend- 
ments .  Although one might suppose the articles emerged 
due to some covert urging by Republican Censors, those 
articles do appear to be of a non-partisan nature, im- 
ploring serious consideration rather than exhibiting 
sympathy for either party.  However, at the same time, 
lengthy articles also appeared in the same newspaper by 
"One of the Majority" or "One of the Minority" of the 
Council of Censors.  In contrast to the articles by private 
citizens, these discourses illuminated for the reader the 
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faults of the opposing group. 
Upon reconvening on June 1, 1784, some changes had 
taken place in the membership of the Council of Censors 
and, hence, in the partisan balance of that body.  Samuel 
Miles, a Republican from the City of Philadelphia had re- 
9 
signed.   A new election brought in George Bryan, "high 
priest of the Radicals," to take his place.  Also, James 
McLene, a Constitutionalist from Cumberland County who had 
not come to the winter session except for the very first 
meeting, now appeared and remained.  Furthermore, Samuel 
Davidson, a Bedford County Republican, did not remain in 
June; neither did William Irvine, a Republican from 
Cumberland County.  Finally, James Potter, a Constitution- 
alist, was elected from Northumberland County to replace 
Samuel Hunter, who did not attend any winter meetings 
after the first one.  William Montgomery, the other Con- 
stitutionalist representative from Northumberland County 
who also had not attended the winter session, arrived in 
1For examples, see The Pennsylvania Gazette, Feb. 25, 
1784, March 31, 1784. 
2Miles probably resigned because the Comptroller 
General of Pennsylvania, John Nicholson, had discovered 
irregularities in Miles' handling of state monies, although 
he was later acquitted by the Assembly.  Brunhouse, 
Counter-Revolution, p. 161. 
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3 June and remained. 
The Council of Censors now consisted of fourteen Con- 
stitutionalists and only ten Republicans.  Then, when 
Stephen Chambers, a Lancaster County Republican, left 
after the first meeting on June 1, 1784, the Republicans 
had only nine members.  Joseph Hart, a Constitutionalist 
from Bucks County, became President pro tempore for the 
summer session, wielding as much influence as Frederick 
Muhlenberg had for the Republicans in the winter.  In 
adding George Bryan to the Council, the Constitutionalists 
gained more power, for he was at that time a judge of the 
Supreme Court.  Although it was illegal in Pennsylvania to 
hold two public offices at once, Bryan possessed sufficient 
power to allow him to do so in spite of repeated protests 
submitted to The Pennsylvania Gazette by "A Citizen of 
4 
Pennsylvania."   Nevertheless, these personnel changes did 
not alter the results of the summer meetings of the Censors, 
which simply repeated what had taken place in the winter. 
They accomplished nothing substantial. 
During the four-month lapse, the committee to 
3Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, p. 161. New Jersey 
Gazette, No. 319, June 21, 1784. Providence Gazette and 
Country Journal, June 19, 1784. 
4The Pennsylvania Gazette, Sept. 1, 1784, Sept. 8, 
1784-Sept. 29, 1784. 
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investigate whether the constitution had been preserved 
inviolate was supposed to have continued its work so that 
it could issue a report upon reconvening.  However, little 
in the way of constructive work took place during that 
time.  In June the committee still claimed it had not had 
enough time to complete its investigation.  A committee 
appointed on June 24, 1784, to investigate the manner in 
which public taxes had been levied and collected, as re- 
quired by Article Forty-Seven, suffered the same fate. 
5 Neither of these two committees ever issued any reports. 
The Censors' lack of positive accomplishment in the 
summer resulted largely from the same problems that had 
plagued their winter session, except that the Radicals 
held the majority in the summer.  All committee reports 
lagged behind schedule and, as noted above, new committees 
consisting of all Constitutionalists produced no better 
results than had the Republicans.  Furthermore, the 
Assembly, still dominated by Republicans and realizing the 
Republican majority had been lost in the Council of 
Censors, grew even more adamant toward that body of men. 
What little discussion did occur still centered around 
proposed amendments to the Constitution of 17 76; however, 
Journal of the Council of Censors, June 7, 1784, 
June 24, 1784.  Article XLVII (see Appendix I). 
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because the majority had been reversed, those opposed to 
changes now won the balloting on each proposal. 
The Council of Censors, while sketchily and unclearly 
outlined in Article Forty-Seven of the Pennsylvania Con- 
stitution of 1776, actually developed its own internal 
structure, for nothing really restricted it.   That struc- 
ture lent itself to a very loose interpretation, and the 
Censors took full advantage of it. 
Although this group of men were bound by their very 
election to uphold the laws, they actually sanctioned il- 
legalities.  The most blatant of these occurred with the 
acceptance of the election of George Bryan as a Censor. 
However, the rationale was clear.  The Radicals held the 
majority and, by adding Bryan who was simultaneously a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice, they received greater 
7 
support for their "cause" against the Republicans. 
Another case of outright disobedience to the same law 
"See "Rules and Regulations of the Council of Censors" 
(Appendix II) . 
7HSP, Bryan Papers, 1784, Folder 4.  Since the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court records consist only of the 
cases heard, it is difficult to determine whether other 
members of the Supreme Court raised any objections to 
Bryan's actions.  However, in view of the fact that Bryan 
continued to sit as a Supreme Court Justice, it is reason- 
able to conclude that his dual role was at least accepted, 
if not actually sanctioned,by the Court. 
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occurred.  John McDowell, a Constitutionalist from 
Washington County, continued throughout the sessions of the 
Censors to hold a position on the Supreme Executive 
p 
Council.   Since the Constitutionalists did have the ma- 
jority in the Council of Censors, and since neither the 
Assembly nor the Supreme Executive Council had the 
authority to check the Censors, McDowell's election re- 
mained valid, just as Bryan's had.  Both of these instances 
clearly indicated the priority given to partisan politics 
within the Council of Censors' summer session, just as it 
had in the winter session. 
Although in Bryan's case no determination can be made 
regarding the reaction of other Supreme Court justices to 
his holding two offices concurrently, some evidence does 
exist to indicate the reaction of the Supreme Executive 
Council to McDowell's infraction of the same law.  On 
July 3, 1784, the Supreme Executive Council requested the 
State Treasurer to pay the members of the Council of 
Censors.  Among these was John McDowell:  ". . .in favor 
of the Honorable John McDowell, Esq., for the sum of 34 
pounds 2 shillings and 6 pence specie. . .the said sums 
being in full payment for their attendance. . .as members 
p 
°Boyd Crumrxne, History of Washington County, 
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1882), p. 913. 
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of the Council of Censors till the third of July, 1784." 
McDowell again received Censor's pay on September 25, 
1784, upon the completion of the Council of Censors 
session.  Also, on September 30, 1784, along with all 
other members of the Supreme Executive Council, "an order 
was drawn on the Treasurer in favor of the Honorable John 
McDowell, Esquire, for nineteen pounds five shillings 
specie, in full for his attendance as Councillor until 
g 
this day, inclusively."   A perusal of the minutes of 
other sessions of the Supreme Executive Council during the 
summer of 1784 shows that McDowell attended regular 
Supreme Executive Council sessions, in addition to Censor 
sessions.  At no time does the record indicate he was 
criticized by other Supreme Executive Council members. 
The fact that he actually received his regular pay indi- 
cates that the Supreme Executive Council could not have 
objected very strenuously, if at all. 
The Censors suffered from another complicating 
problem during the summer which had also occurred during 
their sessions a few months earlier.  They did not confine 
their activities to their stated duties, however sketchily 
defined in Article Forty-Seven.  Rather, they rambled in 
Q 
^Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council, Vol. XIV, 
pp. 156, 213, 216. 
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and out of their own jurisdiction, also detracting from 
their accomplishments.  Here again, their loose structure 
permitted them to do such things.  Their judicial involve- 
ments consistently demonstrated the partisan nature of the 
organization, for most of the cases they reviewed resulted 
from political controversies and contests involving 
Radicals and Republicans. 
The Philadelphia election case (described in Chapter 
III) represented one such incident during the winter.  An- 
other surfaced during the summer session.  The old College 
of Philadelphia had been converted in 1799 into the 
University of Pennsylvania.  Radicals in control of the 
Assembly at the time had backed the move to dispossess the 
trustees of the College of Philadelphia.  Dr. William 
Smith, ousted provost of the College of Philadelphia, urged 
the Assembly to investigate his claim for reinstatement. 
However, the Assembly did not act until March 1784, when 
it finally decided to do nothing further until the recon- 
vening of the Council of Censors.  Because the issue could 
create intense political battles within the Assembly, its 
leaders, all Republicans, decided to let the expected 
Republican majority in the Council of Censors use its power 
to reinstate the trustees.  Upon realizing that the Re- 
publicans in the Council of Censors no longer held the 
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majority, the Assembly leaders felt compelled to appoint 
their own committee to investigate the matter in July 1784. 
However, since the issue dealt with essentially a private 
matter because the college was not state-controlled, the 
Assembly could not dictate a solution. u 
The Censors took up the issue on August 27, 1784.  At 
that time, the Radicals succeeded in preventing restora- 
tion of the old College of Philadelphia by pointing out 
that of twenty-one trustees, fourteen had either died or 
had been attainted for treason.  Eleven was the minimum 
number required to sustain the charter.  Therefore, the 
University of Pennsylvania became the successor to the 
old College of Philadelphia.  In the typical partisan 
alignment of the Council of Censors, all the Constitution- 
alists had supported the University of Pennsylvania, while 
all nine Republicans favored restoration of the old College 
of Philadelphia under its remaining trustees. 
Investigation of proposed amendments to the Pennsyl- 
vania Constitution of 1776 remained a key issue even in 
the summer session.  The Censors continued to discuss those 
matters periodically, but without any progress.  The 
Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution, pp. 153-154. 
J-^The Pennsylvania Gazette, Sept. 15, 1784.  Journal 
of the Council of Censors, Aug. 27, 1784. 
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Republicans, in the minority during the summer, certainly 
held no hope of gaining the two-thirds majority necessary 
to call a convention.  Finally, on August 31, 1784, the 
Council of Censors passed the following resolution: 
. . .That this council will, on 
Wednesday, the fifteenth day of 
September next, resolve itself 
into a committee of the whole, 
to consider whether it is proper 
or necessary to call a Conven- 
tion to amend, explain, or alter 
the Constitution. ^ 
They later postponed the date until September 17, but the 
results remained the same:  fourteen Constitutionalists 
voted against the convention, and nine Republicans voted 
for it.  Therefore, the measure never gained the support 
of a majority, let alone the necessary two-thirds. J  The 
complete reversal of the earlier attitude toward a consti- 
tutional convention and the proposed amendments clearly 
emphasized again the rule by partisan politics, as had 
happened in the earlier Council of Censors session.  Po- 
litical partisanship dominated the body, since no reasons 
were given for assent or dissent. 
As the final meeting opened on September 24, 1784, 
12 Journal of the Council of Censors, Aug. 31, 1784. 
Providence Gazette and Country Journal, Sept. 1, 1784. 
New Jersey Gazette, Sept. 1, 1784. 
-*--*Journal of the Council of Censors, Sept. 17, 1784 
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the vital question appeared again:  "Should a convention 
be called?"  Again, as in previous meetings, the entire 
Radical majority voted not to call the convention, while 
the entire Republican minority favored such a convention. 
Although too late, points of argument for both sides 
finally surfaced that day.  The Radicals claimed that, in 
checking with the voters, the majority did not favor 
calling a convention.  In support of this stand, George 
Bryan presented a remonstrance signed by 433 persons 
against calling a convention. 4  Radicals offered no other 
proof, and the origin of the 433 signatures was not re- 
vealed. 
The Radicals in the Council of Censors had earlier 
heaped great blame on the Republican-dominated Assembly 
for failures which had previously occurred in the state 
government.  Now, the Republican committee that had inves- 
tigated the need for amendment cited Radical Censors' 
violations of the constitution.  The Radicals, realizing 
their predicament created by these charges, quickly justi- 
fied their decision not to call a convention in two ways: 
1) the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 had operated 
during seven years if war, and it deserved a trial through 
14Ibid., Sept. 24, 1784 
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seven years of peace (until the next scheduled Council of 
Censors); 2) the faults lay not in the frame of government, 
but rather with the Republican leaders elected by the 
people. -^ 
During the last few weeks, the Censors extended their 
powers to include practically anything the people would 
bring to them.  They discussed land cases and the validity 
of civil and criminal cases already decided, even though 
they had no authority to do so.  Their minutes are filled 
with these cases.  They also declared illegal the Test 
Laws for foreigners desiring citizenship. °  As in previous 
instances, the Censors passed judgments on their own in all 
these areas.  Not only did they lack authority to make such 
decisions, but they also lacked enforcing power.  Unques- 
tionably, their decisions could not replace the law, and 
therefore no one had to abide by them. 
With the lack of any accomplishment, and in an effort 
to see that the constitution would remain in tact for a 
time at least, the Radical Censors took advantage of their 
majority and on September 24, 1784, adjourned the Council 
15Ibid. 
16For examples, see Ibid., Aug. 16, 1784.  The Penn- 
sylvania Gazette, Sept. 22, 1784.  The Test Laws were 
required before a foreigner could be permitted to take an 
oath of allegiance, following one year's residence in the 
state. 
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of Censors, about one month before their one-year session 
would normally have ended.17  The next session of new 
Censors would have met in November 1790, but the new Penn- 
sylvania Constitution of 1790 abolished that body. 
The Radicals realized that for seven years the Penn- 
sylvania Constitution of 1776 could not change, but they 
claimed that if the people would put their minds to it, 
they could live in peace, and the constitution could prove 
a source of "constant blessings."  Therefore, the majority 
urged the people of Pennsylvania: 
Give it a fair and honest trial, and 
if after all, at the end of another 
seven years, it shall be found neces- 
sary or proper to cause any changes, 
they may be brought in and established 
upon a full conviction of their use- 
fulness, with harmony and good temper, 
without noise, tumult, or violence. 
The correspondence of Thomas Hartley to his friend 
Jasper Yeates demonstrated the sometimes negative view with 
which much of the Censors' work had been undertaken.  On 
July 9, 1784, Hartley wrote to Yeates:  'T am sorry that I 
cannot inform you of anything meritorious from our Body. 
We shall not be able to do much good; it will be well if we 
-^Journal of the Council of Censors, Sept. 24, 1784 
18Ibid. 
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do no harm."19  The uncertainty of events emerged in 
Hartley's letter of July 14, 1784:  "What we shall do in 
our Body is very uncertain, but I despair of men effecting 
the partial good you [Yeates] speak of. . . .  The other 
gentlemen [Radicals] think they have the ball at their 
foot and I believe will amaze the world.' ° 
In the summer session, as well as the winter, the 
Council of Censors found itself hampered by restrictions 
imposed by the constitution, and stifled by inherent po- 
litical fighting.  The Censors could not force the Assembly 
to cooperate or abide by their rulings.  Even if the con- 
stitution had granted them such power, their partisan 
alignments and extreme political differences would have 
precluded any positive accomplishment. 
19HSP, Yeates Papers (July 9, 1784), Folder 3.  Of 
all the Censors from whom any correspondence could be 
found, Hartley seems to have been the most revealing and 
descriptive in relating problems encountered by the Council 
of Censors as a whole. 
20Ibid., (July 14, 1784). 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Censors had accomplished little in either of their 
two sessions.  It would be unfair and incorrect to say the 
Council of Censors failed, since it did not really have a 
chance to accomplish the things expected by some of the 
more optimistic observers of the day. 
The very creation of the Censors stemmed from both a 
deeply ingrained fear held by the constitutional framers 
and a popular distrust of government.  In the framers' 
efforts to protect rights and to prevent unwanted or simple 
change, they devised an anti-activist constitution, with 
the Council of Censors as a guardian of the constitution 
and as the first in a complicated series of steps to con- 
stitutional amendment. 
Due to the nature of the constitution and the limited 
actual authority granted to the Council of Censors, its 
only real duties were to inquire into the matters outlined 
in Article Forty-Seven.  It had no way to enforce any 
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decisions, whether regarding items within or without its 
jurisdiction, for nowhere in the Pennsylvania Constitution 
of 1776 was there any reference to enforcing authority. 
Recommendations were all it could offer.  The constitu- 
tion's failure to specify any enforcement power must weigh 
heavily in evaluating the rather sparse results of the 
Council of Censors, an agency that must be considered 
within the total context of that obstructionist document 
created by the Radical Whigs.  Under their leadership, the 
constitution reflected their sentiments against strong and 
active government. 
In addition to the severe problems caused by the very 
nature of the constitution, the balloting results on prac- 
tically all matters undertaken by the Censors indicate 
strong political ties and partisan maneuvering.  Members 
of that body thought of themselves first as "Radicals" or 
"Republicans" and only secondarily as "Censors."  Such at- 
titudes brought them to one stalemate after another, until 
the only positive thing they could do on the two occasions 
when they met was to adjourn. 
Constitutional problems and partisanship must not re- 
ceive all the blame for the Censors' lack of results. 
1Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution, pp. 173, 206-212 
Dunaway, Pennsylvania, pp. 178-182. 
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Without doubt, a good deal of foot-dragging did occur 
within the body.  Some of the comments of Anthony Wayne 
and William Irvine demonstrate such attitudes.  On 
December 9, 1783, Wayne wrote to Irvine:  "Are you good 
2 
at procrastination?  Remember you are now a Censor."   In 
his reply, Irvine wrote to Wayne:  "I begin to fear our 
time and pains will be spent in vain; however we must 
acquit ourselves to our constituents. . . .  There is a 
disposition. . .for that promptitude I have been so long 
accustomed to. . .but I will try to conquer it and lose 
3 
the Soldier in the Statesman. 
Finally describing the apathetic attitude of the body 
in general, one of Irvine's letters points out:  "The 
several committees pretend to be busy, but procrastination 
seems to suit all parties."   From the insight gained from 
these pieces of correspondence, one might conclude that 
most, if not all, of the Censors finally realized that no 
action or results would ever be possible.  Therefore, they 
simply procrastinated and proceeded much as they pleased, 
2George D. Albert, History of the County of Westmore- 
land, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1882), p. 204.  HSP, 
Wayne MSS (Dec. 9, 1783), Vol. 19, p. 33. 
3HSP, Irvine Papers (Dec. 10, 1783), Vol. 8, p. 83. 
4HSP, Wayne MSS (June 15, 1784), Vol. 19, p. 43. 
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making their ground rules as they went along. 
As Allan Nevins observed, Pennsylvania had one of the 
most restrictive constitutions of all the states.  The pos- 
sibility of amendment was extremely limited because of the 
provision for a Council of Censors.  Only one other state, 
Vermont, adopted Pennsylvania's idea of a Council of 
Censors when it copied Pennsylvania's constitution almost 
verbatim in 1777.  The Vermont Council of Censors' 
authority and powers fell within practically the same limi- 
tations as those of Pennsylvania, in that it could only 
make recommendations which subsequently had to be approved 
by a constitutional convention.  Nevertheless, the system 
did work in that state when the Censors met in 1786.  Their 
proposed changes met with approval of the convention that 
met later.  However, the success of that body as compared 
with the Pennsylvania Council of Censors lay in the homo- 
geneity of the Vermont population as well as that state's 
5 
comparatively mild party animosities. 
In the final analysis, the Council of Censors suffered 
defeat from the first day of its session.  The Council 
could not succeed in bringing about change, even if the 
members had been able to agree on what changes were needed; 
^Nevins, American States, 2nd ed., pp. 119, 675 
Wood, Creation, p. 339. 
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it could only maintain the status quo.  Republicans, who 
had originally wanted change in the state government, 
finally reconciled themselves to the fact that no change 
could be accomplished and contented themselves with putting 
up a front for their constituents.  The Constitutionalists, 
satisfied with the system, procrastinated and opposed 
efforts to create changes.  A modus vivendi seems to have 
been established between the two parties and they waited 
until their mandatory year of service ended.  Finally, 
with the realization that the Council of Censors was at 
best a poor excuse for an effort to control government, 
the provision for such a body was eliminated in the new 
state constitution of 1790. 
Ironically perhaps, the creation of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1790 can be linked at least indirectly to 
the Council of Censors, but more directly to the Radical 
majority and control of that body in the summer session. 
Following the Council's adjournment and the subsequent pre- 
servation of the state constitution of 1776, the Radicals 
in 1784 swept the election for state Assembly members.  In 
their renewed over-confidence, the Radicals drifted into a 
precarious position by rather insolent behavior, even going 
so far as to annul the Charter of the Bank of North America, 
That action in particular drew strong opposition from the 
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state's citizenry. 
The Radicals suffered a crushing defeat when the state 
ratifying convention approved the new Federal Constitution 
in December 1787.  That federal document exhibited a sense 
of organization and symmetry which stood in sharp contrast 
to the unwieldy government provided by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776.  Strong discontent with the state 
constitution led to statewide demands for a new Pennsylvania 
constitution more in harmony with the obviously meritorious 
7 
new Federal Constitution. 
The Radicals, led by George Bryan, one of the chief 
authors of the state constitution of 1776, had constantly 
advised concerned citizens in the state that the Council 
of Censors would meet again in 1790, and that no changes, 
including the ratification of the Federal Constitution, 
could take place until that time.  But as Allan Nevins had 
observed: 
It was idle to say that Pennsylvania 
must wait for the Council of Censors, 
for the seven least populous counties 
could block any action by that body. 
Moreover sections of the Constitution 
of 1776 and the Declaration of 
Independence showed that the people 
had an inherent right to alter a bad 
Nevins, American States, 2nd ed., p. 196 
7Ibid., p. 197. 
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o 
government when and how they pleased. 
From January 1789 through March 1789, there existed 
great popular pressure to change the restrictive state 
constitution of 1776.  Such pressure resulted in the pub- 
lishing of several articles in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 
discussing defects of the constitution.  The legislature 
yielded to that pressure, and on March 24, 1789, completely 
disregarding Article Forty-Seven of the constitution of 
1776, called a new Constitutional Convention by a vote of 
41 to 17.  The legislature apparently agreed with the 
petitions that citizens of the state enjoyed a right to 
change a faulty constitution.  The convention formed a 
quorum in November of 1789.  Therefore, the Council of 
Censors never became involved in the calling of the con- 
vention since their next election and meeting was not 
scheduled until the fall of 1790, and the strong proponents 
of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, such as George 
Bryan, did not possess enough power to overrule the vote 
9 
of the legislature in 1789. 
p 
"Ibid.  This assessment is based on a widely circu- 
lated petition in favor of a constitutional convention, as 
published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, March 11, 1789, as 
cited by Nevins. 
9Ibid. 
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In the end, the control that the Radical Censors felt 
they possessed to prevent changes to the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 actually worked against them.  Their 
hard-line stand had not only caused ill feelings toward 
Article Forty-Seven, but it actually helped sway Pennsyl- 
vanians in their demands for a new constitutional conven- 
tion, the one thing above all else that the Radical 
Council of Censors had wanted to avoid.  The legalities 
written into the constitution of 1776 could not stand in the 
way of needed or desired changes to the entire document. 
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APPENDIX I 
ARTICLE XLVII OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
CONSTITUTION OF 1776 
In order that the freedom of this commonwealth 
may be preserved inviolate for ever there shall be 
chosen, by ballot, by the freemen in each city and 
county respectively, on the second Tuesday in 
October, in the year one thousand seven hundred and 
eighty-three, and on the second Tuesday in October 
in every seventh year thereafter, two persons in 
each city and county of this state, to be called 
THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS, who shall meet together on 
the second Monday of November next ensuing their 
election; the majority of whom shall be a quorum 
in every case, except as to calling a convention, 
in which two-thirds of the whole elected shall agree, 
and whose duty it shall be to enquire whether the 
constitution has been preserved inviolate in every 
part; and whether the legislative and executive 
branches of government have performed their duty, 
as guardians of the people, or assumed to them- 
selves or exercised other or greater powers than 
they are entitled to by the constitution; they are 
also to enquire whether the public taxes have been 
justly laid and collected in all parts of this 
commonwealth, in what manner the public monies have 
been disposed of, and whether the laws have been 
duly executed:  For these purposes they shall have 
power to send for persons, papers, and records; 
they shall have authority to pass public censures, 
to order impeachments, and to recommend to the 
legislature the repealing such laws as appear to 
them to have been enacted contrary to the princi- 
ples of the constitution.  These powers they shall 
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continue to have for and during the space of one 
year, from the day of their election, and no longer. 
The said council of censors shall also have power 
to call a convention, to meet within two years 
after their sitting, if there appear to them an 
absolute necessity of amending any article of the 
constitution, which may be defective, explaining 
such as are necessary for the preservation of the 
rights and happiness of the people; but the articles 
to be amended, and the amendments proposed, and such 
articles as are proposed to be added or abolished, 
shall be promulgated at least six months before the 
day appointed for the election of such convention, 
for the previous consideration of the people, that 
they may have an opportunity of instructing their 
delegates on the subject. 
^Pennsylvania Archives, Series IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 646- 
647. 
78 
APPENDIX II 
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE COUNCIL 
OF CENSORS1 
I.  As soon as the President assumes the chair, the 
members shall take their seats. 
II.  The minutes of the preceding day shall then be 
read, and petitions, memorials or letters, if 
any have been received. 
III.  Every petition, memorial or letter, on which no 
order is moved, shall be considered of course 
as ordered to lie on the table, and may be taken 
up at any future time. 
IV.  When a report which has been read and laid over 
for consideration, is called for, it shall 
immediately be taken up; if two or more are 
called for, the Council, without entering into 
any debate, shall determine which shall be 
first read, but an order of the day, when 
called for by any member, shall always have 
preference. 
V.  When a motion is made and seconded, it shall be 
repeated by the President, or, being in writing, 
it shall be delivered to the President, and read 
aloud at the table, before it shall be debated. 
VI.  Every question shall be reduced to writing, if 
the President or any member requests it. 
1Journal of the Council of Censors, Nov. 18, 1783 
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VII. When a motion is before the Council, no other 
motion shall be received, unless for amending 
it—for the previous question--or to postpone 
the consideration of the main question—or to 
commit it. 
VIII.  No new motion or proposition shall be admitted, 
under colour of amendment to the question 
under debate, until it is postponed or re- 
jected. 
IX.  The previous question (which shall always be 
understood to be, "Shall the main question 
be now put?") shall only be admitted at the 
desire of four members, and shall preclude 
all amendments and further debates on the 
subject, until it is decided. 
X.  A motion for commitment shall also have pref- 
erence, and preclude all amendments and de- 
bates on the subject, until it shall be 
decided. 
XI.  On motion for the previous question, or for 
postponing, no member shall speak more than 
once.  No member shall be permitted to speak 
more than twice to any question, except to 
explain, or with the permission of the Council. 
XII.  A majority of votes shall govern in all 
questions, except as to calling a Convention. 
The President, like the other members, shall 
be entitled to his vote. 
XIII.  If any member chooses to have the Yeas and 
Nays taken upon any question, he shall move 
for the same, previous to the President's 
putting the question; and in such case, every 
member present shall openly, and without de- 
bate, declare, by Ay or No, his assent or dis- 
sent to the question. 
XIV.  Every member, when he chooses to speak shall 
rise and address the President.  When two 
members rise at the same time, the President 
shall name the person who shall speak first. 
XV.  No member shall presume to divulge the debates 
of business of the Council, when secrecy is 
enjoined. 
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XVI.  The member shall avoid naming others in de- 
bate, and have reference to them by dis- 
tinguishing the time of their speaking, or 
their seat, whether to the right or left of 
the chair. 
XVII.  When a member transgresses, the President 
shall call to order; if continued, he may name 
the person transgressing:  Any member may 
desire the President to call to order. 
XVIII.  When a member is called to order, he shall 
immediately sit down; and if called on by 
name, his conduct shall then be enquired 
into, and such censure passed, as the 
Council may deem proper. 
XIX.  Any member called to order may be allowed to 
explain himself; but no debate shall be 
allowed on such cases. 
XX.  When a question of order is moved, the Presi- 
dent, if he is in doubt, may call for the 
judgment of the Council; otherwise he shall, 
in the first instance, give a decision, and 
an appeal shall lie to the Council, but there 
shall be no debates on questions of order. 
XXI.  A motion to adjourn shall always be in order, 
and may be made at any time, and the question 
thereon shall always be put, without any 
debate. 
XXII.  All committees shall be appointed by the 
President, unless it shall be otherwise 
determined by a majority of the members. 
XXIII.  When a motion is made and seconded, the name 
of the member who moves, and of him who 
seconded it, shall be entered on the Minutes. 
XXIV.  Every member who does not punctually attend 
within half an hour after the time of 
adjournment, shall pay a fine of Two 
Shillings and Six-pence, which shall be 
received by the Secretary and be applied 
as Council may direct. 
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